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Abstract: This article discusses the relationship between 
Islam and terrorism. The West accuses Islam as a 
religion inspiring the act of terrorism. This accusation 
stemmed from the fact that there are many terrorist 
attacks perpetrated by extremist Muslims in the name of 
Islam. This article argues that there is no single verse in 
the Holy Qur’an that teaches Muslims to commit the 
acts of terrorism. The rise of violence in the Muslim 
world is a result of internal factors other than religion 
such as unjust social and economic Muslim condition, 
repressive domestic political regime and the West 
intervention in Muslim politics. This article also shows 
that some extremist Muslims misinterpret doctrine of 
Jihad and uses such doctrine to achieve their political 
aims. 
Keywords: terrorism, jihad, Islamic radicalism, political regime      
Introduction 
The September 11 attack has brought the issue of Islam 
and violence into focus worldwide. Muslim extremists, 
apparently from Al-Qaeda members, had hijacked the airplanes 
into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the name of 
God (Pallmeyer, 2003: 13). President George W. Bush pledged 
to ‘rid the world of evildoers’ and declared the war on terrorism 
combating not only the perpetrators but also the rogue states 
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and terrorist organisations in the world (Chomsky in Booth and 
Dune, 2002: 128). The perception of western people that 
terrorism is related to Islam is strengthen when the US 
Department of State (2003) included terrorist organisations in 
its list, mostly located in Muslim countries.   
Many scholars have different perspectives on Islam and 
terrorism. For Huntington, Islam is the enemy of the West. He 
states that “the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic 
fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilisation whose 
people is convinced of superiority of their culture, and are 
obsessed with the inferiority of their power” (1996: 217). 
Pallmeyer argues that the Koran, as God’s revelation, 
encourages Muslims to commit the acts of violence. “Religious 
violence”, he states, “prevalent among the followers of 
monotheistic traditions is not primarily a problem believers 
distorting their ‘sacred text’. It is, rather, a problem rooted in 
the violence of God traditions that lie at the heart of these 
‘sacred texts’” (Pallmeyer, 2003: 73-93). In contrast, 
Juergensmeyer states that Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda is 
a minority within the Muslim world. “Osama bin Laden is no 
more representative of Islam than Timothy McVeigh is of 
Christianity, or Japan’s Shoko Asahara is of Buddhism” 
(Juergensmeyer, 2002: 358).  Taheri  argues that Islam is not 
religion of terrorism. What Hezbollah, Khomeini, and radical 
Muslims do is not representation of Islam and “Islam is not 
limited to what Khomeini teaches” (Taheri,1987: 11). Only a 
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small minority of Muslims agree with the acts of violence 
against disbeliefs in unconditional circumstance.  
According to Islamic teachings, however, Muslims are 
not allowed to attack innocent people. The use jihad is also 
restricted to defensive mechanism. This article argues firstly, the 
western perception of Islam as a religion inspiring terrorism is 
misleading. Secondly, the emergence of radical Islamic 
movements justifying the acts of violence and terrorism is a 
result of political and social grievances and western intervention 
rather than of Islam itself. Finally, this essay demonstrates that 
“defensive jihad” is misinterpreted and misused by radical 
Islamists to justify their acts of violence and terrorism.   
Western Perception, Islam, and Terrorism   
The accusation that Islam inspiring terrorism is based 
on the fact that many radical Islamic movements committed 
acts of violence in the name of Islam. The Office for 
Combating Terrorism of the US Department of State in 1983 
(quoted in Hussain, 1987: 36) stated that nearly 60 percent of 
terrorist casualties in the world occurred in the Middle East. It 
means that terrorist activities mostly committed by Muslims. 
The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt in 1954 tried to murder 
President Nasser who then suppressed this organization (Kepel, 
1993: 41-2). In 1981, Extremist Islambuly assassinated 
President Anwar Sadat. Radical movements, such as Hamas, 
Hezbollah, FIS, GIA and Al-Qaeda target not only the 
Alfiah 
	
JICSA   Volume 02- Number 02, December 2013   201 
	
government officials, military officers but also foreign tourists 
and interests (Norton, 2003: 205-6).   
‘Terror and counter-terror’ represents the struggle 
between good and evil, democracy and totalitarianism and 
depicts a sort of hostility between Islam and the West. Islam is 
a symbol of the force of evil whereas the West is the innocent 
victim (Hussain, 1988: 1-3). Western people will not question 
Christians and IRA connection because IRA uses non-religious 
and political purposes in their acts of terrorism. In contrast, 
Islamic movements such as Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah recruit 
their members, and justify their activities in the name of Islam. 
As noted by Taheri (1987: 10-17),’Islamic Terrorism’ is 
different from others in three aspects. Firstly, as an expression 
of Islamic revivalism, it refuses all secular ideologies such as 
socialism, communism and liberalism. Secondly, Holy war, a 
form of their activity, will not end before the victory is 
achieved. Thirdly, “it forms the basis of a whole theory both of 
individual conduct and of state policy” (Taheri, 1987: 17), based 
on Islamic values and rejects to form alliances with other 
movements in achieving their objectives. “The truth is” as 
Boroumand (2002: 6) argue “that contemporary Islamist terror 
is an eminently modern practice thoroughly at odds with 
Islamic traditions and ethics”. Halliday (2002: 78) notes that 
acts of violence committed by invoking religion is related not 
only to Islam but also to other religions such as Catholics and 
Protestants in Northern Ireland , Baruch Goldstein from 
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fanatical Jews, and Hindu chauvinist group in India (Also look 
at Rappoport,1984: 658-77). Halliday (2002: 78) also states that 
“identification of Islam with terrorism” is intended to 
delegitimise political group such as PLO of Palestine in 
mobilizing Muslims and to restrict terrorism discussion only to 
the Muslim world.  
For Williams, the acts of violence committed by radical 
Muslims are terrorism because “terrorism is politically 
(including ideologically, religiously, or socially-but not 
criminally) motivated violence, directed generally against non-
combatants, intended to shock and terrify, to achieve a strategic 
outcome” (Williams, 2004: 7-10). Thornton also defines 
terrorism in similar way, namely, “a symbolic act designated to 
influence political behaviour by extra normal means, entailing 
the use of threat of power” (quoted in Wardlaw, 2004: 9). 
These extra means include murdering, assassination, hijacking, 
bombing, kidnapping and intimidation (Booth, 2002: 8; Norton, 
2003: 206).  Thornton divides  two kinds of terror , 
enforcement terror which is committed by the state to eradicate 
the challenge that threaten the authority, and  agitation terror 
referring to the use of terror by people to destabilise the 
political order and to replace it (Wardlaw, 2004: 10). Williams 
(2004: 10) recognises state terrorism and passive and active 
state-sponsored terrorism.  It depends on someone’s point of 
vantages in distinguishing resistance from terrorism in the case 
of Islamic radicalism (Esposito, 2002: 130).  However, Norton 
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notes that “… where the state is deaf to its citizens and 
residents violence might be justifiable and legitimate even 
though it is deemed illegal by the authorities” (Norton  in 
Esposito, 2002: 206).   
There is a moral problem in defining terrorism as the 
acts of violence can be justifiable and unjustifiable. The 
boundaries of justifiable and unjustifiable is relative and depend 
on those who define this term. For Israel and the US, PLO is 
an illegitimate terrorist group without moral justification in 
using violence to achieve its goal. In contrast, Palestinians 
consider PLO is a legitimate representative of oppressed people 
and is justifiable to use violence in attaining its goal (Wardlaw, 
2004: 4-5). Unlike Williams, Dawisha (quoted in Azra, 1996: 
147-8), uses Islamic radicalism   to label the acts of terrorism 
committed by Muslims. “If terrorism is only one of policy 
instrument of the movement, radicalism is the essence of the 
policy itself. Radicalism also covers values, purposes and 
concerns from people who formulate the policy.”  PLO may 
leave “terrorism” formally and use diplomatic strategy, 
however, PLO cannot separate itself from radicalism. If so, 
PLO leaves the purpose of Palestine nation to overthrow status 
quo and build the independence Palestine.  “Radicalism”, noted 
Dawisha, “is spirit encouraging people to weaken and change 
the existing political order, by using violence”. In other words, 
radicalism refers to the idea and act which lead people, state 
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and regime to overthrow the existing political order, or to 
change the power relation in international system.    
The 1979 Iranian revolution and hostage crisis were the 
greatest sources of the West’s fear of “Islamic terrorism” 
(Gerges, 1999: 45). This fear created monolithic view towards 
Islam as “threat” (Esposito, 1995), “green perils”, and “new 
enemy” to the US. They believe that terrorism is perpetrated by 
fanatic Muslims who based their acts not on anti-Semitic 
resentment but on Islam which is exemplified by Muhammad 
(Gerges, 1999: 46). Such views followed by Huntington, Pipes, 
and Lewis, are rooted in orientalist tradition covering the actual 
knowledge of Islam (Said, 1981: 161) and in secular view of 
religion assuming that the unification between religion and 
politics lead to extremism as shown by the theocratic Iranian 
government (Esposito, 1995: 243).    
According to Norton (1999: 52), the reality of Muslim 
world is not “a coherent political force”. Muslims are very 
diverse ranging from traditionalists, modernists, liberalists to 
other extremist groups such as Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda This latter 
remains a minority of more than one billion Muslims. Esposito 
(1995: 238-43) also notes that there is no Islamic threat or the 
clash of civilisation between Islam and the West. Political Islam 
is not the threat but the challenge for the West to understand 
various dynamic of Islamic movements, for the local 
governments to respond them positively, and for Islamic 
movements themselves to translate their ideology into peaceful 
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practice rather than revolution. However, temporary anti-
Western unity can be formed, when the Western governments 
are not sensitive to Muslim grievances. Gerges (1999: 31) 
echoing accommodation’s group notes that some Western 
government foreign policies towards the Muslim world such as 
double standard in promoting democracy and uncritical support 
to Israel have become central opposition from Islamists.   
 
The Roots of Islamist Radicalism   
It is argued that the violent conflict was caused by the 
Muslim state in order to suppress Islamic movements resisting 
against the practice of corruption, authoritarianism, and anti-
democracy (Edwards, 2004: 52-3).  It will be a mistake if people 
only rely on the symptoms of the acts of violence without 
understanding the roots of problem. Many western academics 
examine radical Islamic movements in the same way they view 
terrorism in Europe.  Both of them are different, however. In 
most democratic western countries, people can articulate their 
aspirations and demands through political participation; 
therefore, terrorism is abnormal. In contrast, in the Muslim 
World, especially in the Middle East, democracy has not been 
well-developed, most governments are authoritarian, lack of 
legitimacy and not allowing opposition and dissent groups; 
therefore, radicalism is inevitable symptom (Hussain, 1987: 3, 
23).  
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This ‘domestic discontent’ is deteriorated by economic 
problems such as high rate in unemployment, and insufficient 
social infrastructures. Moreover, the practice of corruption 
among government officials is rampant and the economic gap is 
wide between the rich and the poor. These grievances fueled by 
religious justification burst into the acts of violence 
(Fuller,1999: 110). In Algeria, for example, the rise of Islamist 
violence was triggered by the state authoritarianism which 
nullified the general election in which the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS) was on the verge of attaining parliamentary 
majority. Then, the military seized the control of the state, 
detained the leaders of FIS. The decision to halt the election 
was a result of the fear of Islamist “threat” of FIS which gained 
the popular support and called for establishing Islamic society 
by replacing the Algerian government dominated by nationalists 
(Milton, 2004: 52). This led to bloody civil war involving 
military, FIS and Armed Islamic Group (GIA), in which not 
only were governments officials and soldiers killed but also 
civilians  (Esposito, 1995: 179-81). Military arrested 5,000-
30,000 of FIS militants and FIS was dissolved on 4 March 1992 
of committing multiple law violation (Willis, 1996: 256-7). 
However, the idea of nullifying the election, as stated by 
Edwards (2004: 53) was inspired by the US and  France, which 
were fear of Algeria of becoming Islamic state like Iranian 
government.   
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Transformation of Islamic movements from peaceful to 
violent one was also experienced by Egypt. Muslim 
Brotherhood was influential organisation confronting against 
the British colonialism for Egypt independence and 
accommodated by Anwar Sadat’s government. However, under 
Nasser’s government, this organisation was suppressed and its 
leaders were tortured and sentenced to death for their 
opposition. The government responses caused the rise of 
radical movements such as Islamic Jihad and Takfir wa al-Hijrah 
(Esposito, 1995: 133-150). These movements targeted not only 
government officials but also western interests and tourists.   
The West’s intervention, especially the US, in the 
Muslim world has contributed to radicalisation of Islamic 
movements (Fuller, 1995 :111). The US is regarded as the 
“guarantor of the status quo” and it indicates its hypocrisy 
(Hadar, 1993: 39-40). On the one hand, the US promotes 
democratisation by giving the freedom to people to determine 
their future through a general election. On the other hand, 
inspired by “the Islamic threat”, the US backed up many 
authoritarian and repressive regimes in the Muslim world. US 
policymakers believe that democratically elected Islamic 
governments will undermine the US hegemony and interests. 
As a result, the US supports autocratic Saudi government, and 
the Egyptian regime which, noted Middle East watch, “regularly 
resort to physical and psychological torture”. Moreover, the 
Egyptian regime received the second largest the US foreign aid 
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(Hadar, 1993: 39). Iran under Shah was the great example of the 
US intervention. The integration of Iran into western economy 
and culture, its dependence to the US, and its repressiveness 
against Iranian Muslims led to the rise of Islamic revolution 
resonating around the world (Halliday, 2003: 65-7).  
Uncritical support of the US to Israel maintains the 
resentment and opposition from radical Muslims to the West. 
The US always uses its right in the Security Council to veto the 
resolution against Israel (Harb, 2003: 86). The endless brutality 
of Israeli soldiers, continuing loss of territory caused great 
grievance among Muslims which led to the acts of violence. 
Hamas organised in 1987 has promoted anti-Israel occupation 
movement and integrated Palestinian nationalist and Islamic 
radicalism theme (Davidson, 1998: 69-70). Like Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, Hamas involved in the acts of violence such as 
suicide bombing and shooting under the banner of jihad. 
Although it reduced its violence after Oslo Peace Accord was 
signed in 1993, Hamas has escalated its violence after Israel 
continued its occupation and expansion of Palestinians’ 
settlement. 
The rise of international terrorism cannot be separated 
from the involvement of the US Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), Saudi Arabia and ISI in preparing a training ground for 
“jihadists” from all over the world such as Algeria, Egypt, 
Arabian Peninsular and Southeast Asia. They shared together, 
received guerilla warfare training and built extremist Islamic 
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ideology based on armed struggle. By 1982 the Mujahidin 
received US$ 600 million annual aid, including weaponry. This 
intervention was motivated by the US ambition to humiliate 
and overthrow the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. In this case, 
realpolitik reason was more important than ideological one for 
the US. The USA and Saudi also supported Taliban to ascend 
the power due to its Sunni oriented and anti-Shi’ism, and its 
“predicted” ability to protect the US interest, building pipelines 
from Turkmenistan to South Asia. The USA neglected Ahmad 
Shah Massoud, the key person who can prevent the extremism 
of Taliban, who warned the USA and its allies about the danger 
of Taliban- ISI-Al-Qaeda triangle to international and the West 
security (Saikal, 2003: 95-108; Kepel, 2002: 8, 143). The spread 
of “jihadists” with armed, uncontrollable group and access to 
funds made them being involved in the acts of terrorism in 
Algeria, Egypt, and became the greatest threat to Central Asia 
stability (Hadar, 1993:32). They targeted not only “near enemy”, 
secular regimes in the Muslim world, but also “far enemy”, the 
US and the West (Lee, 2004: 46). This logic of jihad became 
Osama’s ideological justification to commit the acts of 
terrorism due to the US invasion to the holy lands in Saudi 
Arabia, severe economic embargo led by the US in Iraq, and the 
endless occupation of Israel in Palestine (Kepel, 2002: 14).    
 
J ihad : Misinterpreted and Misused Doctrine    
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After September 11 attack, jihad has become an 
important word in the West.  Jihad derives from jahada meaning 
“struggle (jahd), exertion, striving; in the juridico-religious sense. 
It signifies the exertion of one’s power to the utmost of one’s 
capacity in the cause of Allah” (Bonney, 2004: 12). It is an 
antonym of sitting (qu’ud). There are two kinds of jihad, the 
greater jihad referring to the spiritual struggle against the evil in 
oneself, and lesser jihad meaning fighting injustice and 
defending Islam (Esposito, 2002: 28). In the Koran, jihad is 
frequently followed by phrase “fi sabil Allah”, in the path of 
God. The believers are ordered to strive with their property and 
soul for the sake of Allah’s pleasure.   
The lesser jihad is connected to physical struggle 
mentioned in the Koran as qatala and harb, to kill, and it is used 
in military and warfare context. This is a concept of ‘legitimate’ 
or ‘just’ war in Islam, al-harb al-mashru’a or al-harb al-‘adilla that is 
different from ‘ghazu’ or ‘adwun’ referring to aggressive and 
robbery motivated-war.  (Halliday, 2002: 48).  Esposito (2002: 
31-32) notes that the war in Islam is “defensive jihad” ruled by 
the Quran in Medina to give a guideline to the Prophet on how 
to overcome upheaval, civil war and to behave during the war 
and peace period. Moreover, justification for jihad based on the 
Islamic universalism is not to force other people to convert to 
Islam. During a war Muslims are strongly prohibited to combat 
innocent people such as women, children, rabbi and monks 
(Look at QS. 2:190, 192, 294; 4:90; 8:61; 9:91; 47: 4; 48: 17). 
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Olivier Roy (2004: 41) argues that the Koran is sterile from 
justification of jihad as understood by Islamic radicals. Jihad is 
neither one of five Islamic pillars nor an individual duty (fardh 
a’yn). During the Prophet, jihad is a collective duty (fardhu 
kifayah) that was stipulated by authoritative jurists. It is not 
stipulated by individual and socially isolated Muslims as 
exemplified by Islamic radicals.  
The change in interpretation of jihad from defensive to 
offensive by using the “sword verses” (QS. 9:5) was initiated by 
Islamic jurists, who relished royal patronage, following the 
spread of Islam beyond Arabian Peninsula. At this period, jihad 
targeted not only Muslim enemies but also apostates, 
polytheists and People of the Book, namely, Jews, Christians 
and other beliefs who did not accept the Islamic rule (Esposito, 
2002: 34-5). This offensive jihad become complex because 
jihadists pursue martyr that transforms a person into eternal 
and peaceful rewards before God (Euben,2002: 373).  
Martyrdom has a good example in Shi’a tradition when Imam 
Hussain, a descendent of Caliphate Ali, was killed in the 
‘tragedy of Karbala’ in opposition against Yazid ibn Mu’awiyah 
(Bonney, 2004: 225). However, Islam values one’s life and 
condemns the suicide as kufr. Only those who are killed in 
defending Islam in defensive jihad can be categorised as a 
martyr (Saikal, 2003: 27).   
Many western scholars state that the “sword verses” 
confirm that Islam legitimates unconditional warfare.  Pallmeyer 
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(2003: 91) argues that “it is less than forthcoming to speak of 
Islam being hijacked by extremists” but the passages of the 
Koran demand Muslims to combat against enemies “in service 
of Allah or in pursuit of “Islamic justice” by using acts of 
violence and terrorism. This statement is similar to Firestone’s 
(1999: 88) stating that the Koran 9: 5 endorses Muslims to kill 
unbelief unconditionally. In response to this, Esposito states 
that people cannot exegeses a verse of the Koran separated 
from context and other verses. “The sword verse” (QS. 9:5), 
cannot be interpreted without examining its following verse 
(9:6) “But if they repent and fulfill their devotional obligations 
and pay the zakat [tax for alms] then let them go their way for 
God is forgiving and kind”. This verse is “a call for peaceful 
relation” and can be used to legitimate offensive jihad if the 
existence of Muslim is threatened (Esposito, 2002: 35).    
Jihad has more political than theological orientation in 
Qutb’s interpretation influenced by Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna 
and Ibn Taymiyya. Qutb’s concept of jihad is started with his 
idea to revive the Islamic glory vis-à-vis western hegemony. Jihad 
is the continuation of the God “politics” and revolutionary 
political struggle to defeat Islamic enemies in order that Muslim 
can implement Islamic law (shari’a). By eradicating political 
barriers, he notes, the central aim of revolutionary struggle can 
be achieved. He also explains that the establishment of Islamic 
hegemony through jihad is intended to liberate individuals from 
non-Muslim political domination (Azra, 1996:137). At this 
Alfiah 
	
JICSA   Volume 02- Number 02, December 2013   213 
	
point, Qutb is strongly influenced by “the logic in Ibn 
Taymiyya’s fatwa on the Mongols to call for a jihad against ‘un-
Islamic’ Muslim rulers and against the West” (Esposito, 2002: 
46; Euben, 2002: 371). As a result, Qutb denies modernist 
Muslims who are prone to restrict jihad as “defensive jihad” or is 
conducted in Muslim territories. For Qutb, there is a close 
relation between jihad and Islam as a dynamic and revolutionary 
religion.  It is recognised that the modernist Muslims such as 
Abduh, Ridha and Syaltut argue that  jihad is conducted against 
non-Muslims only if they attack Muslim and Islam (Azra, 
1996:138).   
Qutb’s revolutionary ideology has inspired many radical 
movements in the Middle East during 1970s, such as Jamaat 
Muslim (Takfir wa al-Hijrah), Muhammad’s Youth, in using 
jihad as justification to challenge the ‘secular’ governments and 
the West and to create Islamic society (Esposito, 2002:62). 
Qutb’s interpretation also influenced Muhammad Faraj, Ali 
Benhadj of FIS, GIA in Algeria, Ayman Zawahiri, and Osama 
bin Laden. The latter studied under Qutb’s brother, 
Muhammad Qutb (Zimmerman, 2004: 240).  Iranian 
Revolution is also traceable to Qutb’s ideology. Khomeni was 
one of Navab Safavi that was invited by Brotherhood to Egypt 
and who met Qutb in 1953. Navab’s group killed some secular 
intellectuals and politicians, but he was executed in 1955 and his 
organisation was dissolved. Khomeini and his followers in 
Islamist cultural association used and spread Qutb’s 
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revolutionary culture, culminated in 1979 Iranian Revolution 
(Boroumand, 2002: 8).  
It is important to note that Qutb and other godfathers 
of revolutionary jihad were influenced by other ideologies in 
interpreting jihad. Boroumand also argue that Qutb is 
“Leninism in Islamic dress” and influenced by Marxist and 
fascist critiques of western capitalism and democracy. When 
Muslim Brotherhood faced challenges from the secular 
government and the communists in Egypt after Banna’s 
assassination, Qutb framed ideological responses for his society.  
However, he was lack of education in traditional theology and 
studied in the US between the year of 1948 and 1950. He 
idealised “a monolithic state ruled by a single party of Islamic 
rebirth” and would use revolution in toppling the enemy, the 
Egyptian rulers. He also imagined an ideal society as classless in 
which “the ‘selfish individual’ of liberal democracies would be 
banished and the ‘exploitation of man by man’ would be 
abolished. God alone would govern it through the 
implementation of Islamic law” (Boroumand, 2002: 8).  
Khan (2003: 420-21), a liberal Muslim scholar argues 
that Qutb’s revolutionary jihad is contrary to the traditional 
Islamic thought emphasising stability and order and rejecting 
rebellions and armed struggle against the state authority. He 
also notes that Qutb apparently was influenced by John Locke’s 
philosophy and ideas of individual freedom, legitimacy of the 
government and the use of revolution. For both of them, 
Alfiah 
	
JICSA   Volume 02- Number 02, December 2013   215 
	
individual freedom is absolute and should be subordinated by 
God only, not to be enslaved by men. Legitimacy of the 
government can be achieved by fulfilling what society need 
during social contract. If the government fails to do, it will be 
illegitimate and subject to be dissolved with revolution if 
necessary. It should be noted, however, that Qutb’s 
interpretation of the faith was influenced by the environment 
where he lived. Qutb lived under Nasser’s regime who was 
socialist and authoritarian and Qutb had difficulty in 
implementing his belief in such environment.  
The domestic grievances, in politics, social and 
economic, combined with the West intervention and religious 
justification fuel the situation to burst into the acts of violence 
and terrorism. Jeurgensmeyer (2000: 212-3) explains this 
transformation in four stages, firstly, the terrorists view the 
problem of Islamic society such as Palestine problems, secular 
states, the West policy, in black and white polarisation. This 
situation is perceived by their group who then united in political 
and social activities to change the situation into Islamic society. 
In this stage, they do not see the possibility to release their 
aspiration through the existing institutions. The third stage is 
“satan-isation” of enemy and cosmic war in which terrorists 
consider the world as contestation between  “the force of evil” 
represented by “the infidels” and “the force of good”, that is, 
the terrorists. In this phase, they seek religious justification, 
jihad, against “the force of evil”. Finally, terrorists perform the 
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acts symbolising the depth of the struggle. They choose the 
violence as an effective method to execute their acts of violence 
such as hijacking, explosion, guerilla war and kidnapping. In 
this context, there is transformation from a worldly struggle 
into a sacred battle in which religious justification accompanies 
cosmic war concept. “It is not so much that religion has 
become politized but the politics has become religionized” 
(Juergensmeyer, 2001: 358).  
People such as Khomeini, Bin Laden and other radical 
Muslims, successfully used Muslim’s grievances against the 
repressive regimes and their supporter, the West, to wage the 
acts of violence and terrorism under justification of jihad. 
Extremist Muslims go beyond traditional interpretation of jihad: 
defensive jihad should be collective duty not individual one nor 
target non-combatants (Esposito, 2002: 153-8). Jihad 
interpretation is subject to change and is not limited to “holy 
war”. As Lawrence (1998: 160-85) notes, the struggle for 
achieving better economic life is absent from jihad advocates. 
Unlike in the Middle East, in Southeast Asian Muslims such as 
Malaysia under Mahathir Muhammad, jihad became the spirit to 
compete with economic globalisation.   
 
 
 
Conclusion   
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Radical Islamic movements have the same ideology that 
has tied them together, the belief in Islam. They are concerned 
with the idea of al-Nizham al-Islamy (Islamic Order), by 
overthrowing “secular regime” and their supporter, the West, 
the US especially and they are using “jihad” as a method to 
achieve the goal. To some extent, the moral justification 
underlying the rise of contemporary radical movements can be 
understood, jihad, conducted by them is more political than 
religious. In this context, the radical Islamic movements are the 
“inevitable result” of “official political terrorism” committed by 
the West and the West-supported authoritarian regimes in the 
Muslim world. The radical Muslims will continue to exist unless 
the just international order is established.  Jihad in Islam as 
encroached in the Koran and practiced by the Prophet 
Muhammad is “defensive jihad”, which has limitations. Muslims 
are prohibited to become transgressive, to kill non-combatants. 
Jihad is interpreted by Islamic jurists and moderate, radical and 
extreme Muslim groups. Therefore, there is no single 
interpretation of jihad which can be accepted throughout the 
history and societies. Interpretation of jihad is subject to change. 
In the case of extremist Islamic movements which use jihad as 
justification for their acts of violence including combating 
innocent people, their interpretation cannot be justified.  
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